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A. The Doctrine on
"Supplied Jurisdiction" Is Applied Regarding a Bishop Who in an
Extraordinary Necessity Consecrates Another Bishop. The Primacy of Jurisdiction
of the Pope.
The doctrine on supplied jurisdiction is ordinarily treated
in regard to the sacrament of Penance because the lack of jurisdiction renders
confession not only unlawful but also invalid. This doctrine, however, can also
be applied to other areas through analogy.37
As a priest in the extreme necessity of the individual or in grave public
necessity without hope of help from the legitimate pastors can and must absolve
sacramentally "given that he has the power of order" (St.
Thomas, op. cit.), so a Bishop, if a grave and general necessity of souls
without hope of help from the legitimate pastors demands it, is able and
duty-bound of transmitting the episcopacy, given that he has the power of order.
Fr. Cappello says that it is certain that the Church supplies
jurisdiction in order to provide for the "public or general necessity of
the faithful" in all those cases "in which she has manifested either
expressly or at least tacitly being willing to supply it." 38
Now, it is evident from history that the Church has manifested, at least
tacitly, her will to supply jurisdiction through the consecration of other
bishops in case of grave general or public spiritual necessity. Recent history
records that "clandestine" bishops were consecrated without Pontifical
approval in order to provide for the grave general necessity of souls. Longer
ago, during the Arian crisis, St. Eusebius of Samosata and other bishops, not
only consecrated but even established other bishops in episcopal sees,39
and the Church has not hesitated to proclaim his sanctity.
Cardinal Billot writes that Our Lord instituted the primacy,
but left in some way the limits of episcopal power undefined, precisely because:
"...it would not have been fitting that those things which are
subject to change would be unchangeably fixed by divine law. Some things are
indeed subject to change because of the variety of circumstances and of times
and because of greater or lesser facility of recourse to the Apostolic See among
other such-like things." (De Ecclesia Christi, Q.XV, §2, p.713)
History confirms that the state of necessity extended not
only the duties of bishops, but also their power of jurisdiction. Dom Grea,
whose attachment to the pope is above all suspicion testifies (De l’Eglise
et de sa divine consitution, vol. I) that not only at the beginning of
Christianity did the "necessity of the Church and the Gospel" demand
that the power of the episcopal order be exercised in all its fullness without
jurisdictional limitations, but that in successive ages extraordinary
circumstances required "even more exceptional and more extraordinary
manifestations" of episcopal power (ibid., p.218) in order "to
apply a remedy to the current necessity of the Christian people" (ibid.
and ff.), for whom there was no hope of aid on the part of the legitimate
pastors nor from the Pope. In such circumstances, in which the common good of
the Church is also at stake, the jurisdictional limitations vanish and
"that which is universal" in episcopal power "comes directly to
the aid of souls" (ibid., p.218):
"Thus in the 4th century
St. Eusebius of Samosata is seen
passing through the Oriental Church devastated by the Arians and ordaining
Catholic Bishops for them without having any special jurisdiction over
them." (op. cit. p.218)
Palazzini recalls that:
"...today jurisdiction (over a diocese) is conferred (upon bishops) directly and expressly by the Pope....Formerly, however, it used to
derive more indirectly from the Vicar of Christ as if from itself it
flowed from the Pope onto those bishops, who were in union and peace with the
Roman Church, mother and head of all churches [emphasis
added]." 40
Jurisdiction
"as if from itself" seems to have
flowed from the Pope in the history of the Church whenever a grave necessity of
the Church and of souls demanded it. In such extraordinary circumstances, says
Dom Grea, the episcopacy proceeded "resolute in the tacit consent of its
Head rendered certain by necessity" (op. cit. vol. I, p.220). Dom
Grea does not say that the consent of the pope rendered the bishops certain of
the necessity. On the contrary, the necessity rendered them certain of the
consent of the pope. Precisely why did the necessity render the consent of their
Head "certain," consent that in reality those bishops were
ignoring? —Evidently because in necessity the positive judgment of Peter is owed.
If from Christ, on the strength of his primacy, Peter has the power of extending
or restricting the exercise of the power of episcopal order, from Christ he also
has the duty to extend or restrict it according to the necessity of the Church
and of souls. In the exercise of the power of the keys, Christ remains always
the "principle agent" and "no other man can exercise [the power
of the keys] as principle agent" (St. Thomas, Supplement,
Q. 19, A. 4), but only "as instrument and minister of Christ" (ibid.,
Q.18, A.4). The keys of Peter are also "keys of ministry," and
therefore not even Peter can use the power of the keys arbitrarily, but must be
attentive to the divine order of things. The divine order is that jurisdiction
flows to others by means of Peter, yes, but such that it is supplied "in a
manner sufficient for the salvation of the faithful" (St. Thomas, Contra
Gentiles, Bk.4, c.72). Therefore, if Peter prevented it from being supplied
sufficiently for the need of souls, he would act against the divine order and
would commit a most grave fault (St. Thomas, Supplement, Q.8, AA.4-9ff.).
Primacy is none other than the fullest possession of that
"public power of governing the faithful so that they may attain eternal
life." 41
It is the fullness of that power of jurisdiction which is "granted not for
the advantage of the trustee, but for the good of the people and for the honor
of God" (ibid., Q.8, A.5, ad.1) and:
"...no principle of law and no sense of equity stands when
that which has been salutarily instituted for the advantage of men is turned to
their harm." (Digesto, cit. in ST, II-I, Q. 96, A. 6; II-II, Q. 60,
A. 5, ad. 2)
Therefore, Dom Grea writes that the extraordinary
manifestations of episcopal power do not call into question the doctrine on the
primacy, because necessity without hope of help from the legitimate pastors
takes the "extraordinary action" of the episcopate back to "the
essential laws of the hierarchy" which are not at all weakened by the
ordinary jurisdictional laws.
Illustrating the hierarchical
constitution of the Church, St. Thomas writes:
"...[H]e who has universal power [i.e.,
the Pope —Ed.]
can exercise upon all the power of the keys. Those, [i.e., the bishops —Ed.],
on the other hand, who under him have received a distinct power, are not able to
use the power of the keys on just anyone, but only on those who have fallen to
them by lot, save the cases of necessity." (Supplement, Q. 20, A. 1)
That means that the hierarchical constitution of the Church,
and hence the primacy, is not put into question by "action otherwise
prohibited and which is rendered licit and permitted by the state of
necessity." 42
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